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Among all nations with nuclear capacities, North Korea remains the world’s poorest. 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the nation is willing to use its nuclear know-how as a bargaining 
tool in negotiations with other countries, a tendency that often frustrates and confounds those 
attempting to negotiate with the single-party state. Indeed, to much of the world, North Korea 
largely retains its enigmatic image as a ‘black box,’ ruled by an autocratic Kim Jong-il (son of 
North Korea’s longest serving and totalitarian leader—and Kim Jong Il’s father—Kim Il 
Sung). In this context, the publication of Patrick McEachern’s new book, Inside the Red Box: 
North Korea’s Totalitarian Politics, is timely. McEachern, a specialist in North Korean 
affairs, challenges the stereotypical view of this country as “some type of monolith” and 
argues that although Kim’s role is critically important within the political arena, North 
Korea’s political institutions play an equally critical role in North Korean politics (p. 4). 
Following his main argument about the existence of a level of pluralism among the political 
institutions in North Korean, McEachern takes the reader on an exciting journey through the 
evolution of North Korean political life under the regimes of the two Kims. 
Through analysis and critique of the competing theories or models of North Korean 
politics (including totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, personalism, institutional pluralism 
and corporatism), McEachern argues that the post-totalitarian model allows for the clearest 
understanding of the North Korean state and its policy making mechanisms. According to the 
author, the post-totalitarian model is one in which the politics within an otherwise totalitarian 
regime are somehow shaped or influenced by the forces of competing institutions within the 
state, thereby tempering the authority of the regime leader. This means that McEachern’s 
focus is primarily concerned not with “whether [power] is dispersed” within North Korean 
politics but “how [it] is dispersed” (emphasis added) (p.30). By connecting his post-
totalitarian model with extensive empirical data that include translated speeches of North 
Korean leaders, official reports, commentaries, and articles, he suggests that all traditional 
models previously applied to the political analysis of North Korea have limitations and are, 
therefore, unable to truly capture the complexities of the North Korean political reality.  
The book is divided into eight chapters. In the core of the book is the analysis of the three 
major institutions that help maintain North Korean regime continuity: the cabinet (the 
government), the military (the Korean People’s Army), and the party (the Korean Worker’s 
party). McEachern discusses the primary political debates among these three institutions on 
three major policies: the State’s economic policy, its inter-Korean policy, and its U.S. policy. 
The book begins with the description of a disagreement between Kim Jong Il,  the chairman of 
the National Defense Commission and the general secretary of the Korean Worker’s Party, 
and Kim Yong-sun, the Korean Worker’s Party Secretary, concerning the presence of 
American troops on the Korean peninsula during a historic visit of the South Korean President 
to Pyongyang in June 2000 (pp.1-2). Such an opening sets the stage for McEachern to 
introduce his main argument about the importance of both individuals and institutions in 
North Korean bureaucracy and the need, therefore, to examine the roles of both individuals 
and institutions when analyzing North Korea’s decision making processes. Next, McEachern 
briefly outlines North Korea’s current economic policy and its policies toward South Korea 
and the U.S.  He then offers a model for understanding North Korean politics based on the 
strong theoretical tradition of comparative politics (the empirical work of area studies), 
followed by his own contributions and reactions to these ideas (p.11). (On this note, the nature 
of McEachern’s contributions does lead the reader to wonder whether this text should be seen 
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as a contribution to the academic field or rather as a timely, topical reader consisting of the 
practical contributions of a foreign-service officer stationed in Seoul.)  
In the second chapter, McEachern analyzes a number of theoretical models that are 
often applied to North Korean political structures and hypothesizes that under Kim Jong Il’s 
regime, authority remains centralized, and Kim Jong Il remains an autocratic leader. However, 
he says, power is more diffuse  in today’s North Korea than it was under the regime of Kim’s 
father, Kim Il Sung (p.34). McEachern develops his main argument further by proposing the 
presence of bureaucratic resistance in North Korean politics, a presence that supports 
McEachern’s hypothesis that political institutions in North Korea do indeed possess authentic 
political leverage (and a presence that would not likely exist if Kim Jong Il were not at least 
minimally amenable to political exchange) (p.48). The theoretical discourse presented in this 
chapter makes McEachern’s work useful not only for understanding the North Korean state 
but also for understanding post-socialist or post-communist regimes generally. The second 
chapter also introduces a research methodology based on content analyses of North Korea’s 
elite press, translated into English by North Korean interpreters. Such analyses are used to 
understand the political debate among the North Korean government, the military, and the 
Korean Workers’ party. Such a choice is perfectly logical, as the three major themes selected 
for analysis within this text make up the core of the North Korean political debate. However, 
McEachern’s overemphasis on theory leads to a weakness in the text with respect to 
understanding the human side of such regimes. When analyses are elevated to the level of 
models and concepts that describe political regimes, the result is a certain dissociation from 
human agency. While McEachern correctly points on page 21 that “[t]otalitarian regimes are 
short lived.” the human cost of such regimes must not be forgotten. 
Chapter Three focuses on the evolution of North Korean politics under Kim Il Sung 
and provides historical context for the current North Korean regime. McEachern notes that 
while much has been written about the birth of the state and its impending death, there is a gap 
in evaluating the whole of North Korea’s political history (p.52). He attempts to bridge this 
gap in this and the next chapters by constructing a history of the North Korean political 
regime, thereby making this chapter an appropriate stand-alone reading for those who may be 
interested in a concise history of the North Korean political regime.      
Chapter Four discusses in more detail the three main political players in North Korean 
politics as McEachern sees it: the cabinet, the Korean People’s Army, and the Korean 
Workers’ Party. The chapter also describes North Korea’s security apparatus, the Supreme 
People’s Assembly (SAP), and provincial and local governments and judiciaries and their 
respective relations with the government, the army, and the party. McEachern concludes that 
the state’s three major political institutions have a corporate-like identity and provide an 
institutional world view in regard to political policy. However, he says, the country’s 
constitutional entities (the security apparatus, the SAP, and the subnational governments and 
their judiciaries) do not have systematic influence on national policy decisions (p.99). 
 The next three chapters test the theoretical constructions described in the first half of 
the book and examine a number of specific policy issues through analyses of political debate 
in the North Korean central press. Chapter Five starts with an examination of the 1998 
constitutional revision and takes the reader through the launch of the first North Korean 
rocket, Taepodong-1, in September 1998 and, in [name year], the negotiations with the U.S. 
regarding inspections of Kumchang-ri, a suspected nuclear facility. This chapter also 
examines the deterioration of North Korean-U.S. relations as a result of the OPlan 5027, 
extracted by the Combined Forces, which outlined military actions that would be undertaken 
by joint U.S.-South Korean forces in the case of military conflict between North Korea and 
South Korea. The chapter focuses further on North Korean economic policy and concludes 
with a discussion of inter-Korean relations. The culmination of the negotiations between 
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North and South Korea, in June 2000, became the first summit between the two Koreas, 
ending only ten days before the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the Korean War. For 
McEachern, it is important that during these negotiations, Kin Jong Il openly admitted that he 
had chosen to engage in such inter-Korean negotiation despite objection from within his own 
party. This admission of Kim Jong Il’s further supports McEachern’s hypothesis that North 
Korean politics is shaped not only by some totalitarian force within Kim Jong Il as an 
individual but rather by the jockeying for and negotiation of power among the three major 
political institutions in North Korea. Indeed, McEachern uses the word “jostling” to describe 
the angling for power demonstrated by these three political entities during the turbulent years 
from 1998 to 2001, a period that was full of struggle for bureaucratic supremacy and control 
of political agendas between the party, the military and the cabinet.  
The next chapter, covering the period between 2001 and 2006, is the largest in the 
book and is heavy on empirical data based on the entire spectrum of political events that 
unfolded following the 9/11, during which the struggle for power among the three leading 
North Korean political institutions continued to dominate the agenda of political life. In this 
chapter in particular, McEachern demonstrates that North Korea responded quite 
appropriately to the rather inappropriate demands of the Bush administration for North 
Korean regime change (pp.156-157). In his State of the Union Address in January 2002, 
President Bush grouped together Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” This united 
the North Korean political institutions together in opposition to the U.S. and prevented North 
Korea from engaging in any authentic diplomatic discourse with the U.S. for some time.  
Interestingly, McEachern’s detailed analysis of the political debate between North Korea and 
the Bush administration regarding U.S. international policy (heavily affected by Bush’s 
rhetoric and his so-called “axis of evil”) leads the reader to understand these debates in a new 
light: McEachern suggests that by not engaging in Bush’s pseudo-diplomatic discourse, North 
Korea was able to move beyond an ideological trap set by the U.S. and, in so doing, 
demonstrated simple common sense. This sidestepping of U.S. rhetoric ultimately permitted 
North and South Korea to engage more authentically in a conversation on inter-Korean 
relations and North Korean economic development.  
Chapter Seven provides an analysis of the shift in policies in both North Korea and the 
U.S. The punitive approach promoted by the Bush administration during 2001-2006 did not 
reach the desired results, and the U.S. subsequently moved towards a more accommodating 
diplomatic course. Between the years of 2006 and 2008 North Korean policy likewise 
underwent a marked shift regarding, first of all, international relations with its major partners, 
the U.S. and South Korea. This occurred as a result of diplomatic efforts to improve relations 
with North Korea by the Bush administration at the end of the Bush presidency, and, on 
another hand, the “hard” policy towards North Korea promoted by new South Korean 
President, Lee Myung-bak, the first conservative president in a decade who was elected in 
2008. External factors influenced the internal debates. Between the years of 2006-2008, the 
party and the military won over the cabinet’s efforts for marketization, that influenced 
economic policy between 2001 and 2006, and a significant shift took place towards food 
distribution at the expense of the markets.  For McEachern, this ability of institutions to shape 
political debates in North Korea and change the political course can most effectively be 
explained by the post-totalitarian institutionalism model (p.214). 
        In the final chapter, McEachern confirms that Kim Jong Il’s regime is different today 
from the regime of his father. The son uses the old strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ when he 
pits institutions against each other. As a result, McEachern comes to the conclusion that 
despite the leverage of political institutions in North Korea, no organized opposition “to the 
state exists within the country” (p.218). Still, he argues that the North Korean state is not as 
monolithic as a pure totalitarian model would suggest (p.219). His argument is based on a 
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detailed analysis of the political debate of the three major political institutions that he 
undertook in the second half of the book in chapters five, six and seven.   
McEachern’s analyes provide the possibility of some prediction of North Korean’s political 
responses, at least to U.S. politics. As such, the North Korean ‘black box’ has begun to 
undergo a transition into a ‘red box,’ one which became less enigmatic to this reader over the 
course of McEachern’s work. Using the Foucauldian expression “knowledge is power,” the 
new knowledge that McEachern provides about North Korea empowers the reader, as it gives 
readers insight into the North Korean political mind. At the very least, the book destroys the 
stereotype of North Korea as “irrational” or “confusing.”  
     While McEachern certainly achieves his objectives as stated in the beginning of the book, 
new questions are raised for future investigations. McEachern’s primary focus was on North 
Korean-U.S. diplomatic relations, with further focus on inter-Korean relations. However, the 
connections between North Korea and the former Soviet Union (now Russia) and China were 
marginally examined. Without undermining the importance of the U.S. and South Korea to 
North Korea, the relations with North Korea’s other two neighbors require further analysis.  
Finally, the main argument of the book also raises further questions, particularly as the notion 
of post-totalitarian itself may be not as original as McEachern indicates. The former Soviet 
Union, a classic example of totalitarian state, at least from a theoretical standpoint, is known 
for inter-party struggle even during times when the totalitarianism was at its zenith. Finally, 
the reader may be likely to generally ponder the nature of types of resistance to totalitarian 
authority. McEachern claims that North Korea does not have any organized opposition to the 
state. However, historians have written a great deal about ‘off-kilter’ forms of resistance that 
do not necessarily distract or antagonize existing domains of power but instead try to 
hybridize them. Such forms of resistance are less structured but not less effective than 
organized resistance.  For example, North Korean defectors and North Korean businessmen 
are among the agents who were involved with economic reforms under King Jong Il, to name 
just a few of those who may be in disagreement with the North Korean regime. The study of 
these less visible forms of resistance can bring some light to the human history of North 
Korea and complement its political history, so well portrayed by McEachern. 
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